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The cutting edge in systems development today is in the area of systems of systems, (SoS) large
networks of inter-related systems that are developed and managed separately, but that also perform
collective activities. Such large systems typically involve constituent systems operating with differ-
ent life cycles, often with uncoordinated evolution. The result is an ever-changing SoS in which
adaptation and evolution replace the older engineering paradigm of development. This short paper
presents key thoughts about verification and validation in this environment. Classic verification and
validation methods rely on having (a) a basis of proof, in requirements and in operational scenarios,
and (b) a known system configuration to be proven. However, with constant SoS evolution, man-
agement of both requirements and system configurations are problematic. Often, it is impossible to
maintain a valid set of requirements for the SoS due to the ongoing changes in the constituent sys-
tems. Frequently, it is even difficult to maintain a vision of the SoS operational use as users find new
ways to adapt the SoS. These features of the SoS result in significant challenges for system proof.
In addition to discussing the issues, the paper also indicates some of the solutions that are currently
used to prove the SoS.
1 Systems of Systems
The concept of a system of systems (SoS) has developed in the last decade and a half through recogni-
tion that many systems are now interconnected to achieve functionality and characteristics that cannot
be achieved by the individual constituent systems. Yet the SoS concept is still poorly defined. Some
definitions include:
“An SoS is a system comprised of elements that are systems.” (Widespread understanding;
assumed in Manthorpe 1996 [4])
“Systems of Systems are large-scale concurrent and distributed systems that are comprised
of complex systems” (Jamshidi 2005 [2])
“An SoS is defined as a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and
useful systems are integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities” (US
DoD 2008, SoSE Guide [1])
These definitions appear to apply to common SoS examples such as military systems, a modern
airport, or manufacturing supply chain management. In these examples, many constituent systems in-
terconnect to obtain high-level functionality that exists above and beyond the individual systems. In
these examples, the constituent systems are typically developed and upgraded in different time frames
by different system owners, adding to the difficulty of the SoS. But the weakness in these definitions is
that they might also apply to other systems, such as a microprocessor, that are clearly not included in
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the usual SoS considerations. These definitions are useful, but represent muddy thinking that does not
distinguish between a “system” and an “SoS”.
The best distinction available was proposed by [3], in which a system is considered an SoS if it
exhibits significant amounts of:
• Emergent Behavior. The SoS performs functions that are not achievable by the independent
constituent systems; stakeholders want assurance of this emergent behavior even in the face of the
challenges created by the following characteristics.
• Geographic Distribution. Spreading the constituent systems across a geographic extent forces the
elements to exchange information in a remote way, resulting in difficult technical communications
issues.
• Evolutionary Development. Functions and purposes are added, removed, and modified within
the system in an ongoing way. As the constituent systems change, there are constant revisions and
difficult integration issues.
• Operational Independence. The constituent systems have purpose, even if detached from the
SoS. The purposes often conflict with each other and also conflict with the purposes of the SoS,
resulting in conflicts among the constituent system stakeholders.
• Managerial Independence. The constituent systems are developed and managed for their own
purposes. Each system has an independent owner and independent stakeholders, who may or may
not overlap with the SoS stakeholders. This independence further exacerbates the conflicts.
The result of these characteristics is a need for new paradigms in systems engineering (SE). Many
traditional SE concepts are counter-productive to the SoS, resulting in methodology that is more evo-
lutionary than developmental in nature, with constant evaluation that results in suggested or influenced
changes in the constituent systems. In many cases, there is actually no central manager for the SoS, so
all changes are handled in a collaborative or competitive way among the constituent system owners.
2 Traditional Approach to Verification and Validation
The long history of systems development has led to a well-understood practice of the proof of comple-
tion. This practice is encompassed in two separate approaches, both of which are part of normal system
development:
• Verification is checking whether an item or artifact has been designed/built to conform with re-
quirements. Multiple methods may be used for the checking, such as inspection, analysis, demon-
stration, or test. This can be applied to the final system, or it can be applied to design artifacts
produced during the system development. An underlying necessity is to have a known list of
requirements stated in such a representation as to be firmly verifiable.
• Validation is checking whether an item or artifact has been designed/built to fulfill its intended
purpose. Again, multiple methods may be applied to the system or to design artifacts. However,
the standard against which validation is performed is the mission need as perceived by the stake-
holders. This standard is often subjective in nature, truly known only by the stakeholders and often
only known after the fact.
Verification is the basis of the normal “Vee” model of systems engineering, in which requirements
are progressively analyzed and allocated downward into lower levels of the system hierarchy, followed
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by verification actions against those requirements while building up the system. If the Vee model is
rigorously followed with firm, verifiable requirements, then the resulting system can be theoretically
shown to conform completely with its requirements.
Validation is also necessary, however, because the true need for the system cannot usually be ex-
pressed in firm, verifiable requirements. The translation from the stakeholder desires into system re-
quirements is performed through operations analysis and is never perfect. Therefore, multiple levels of
requirements validation are necessary to help the requirements conform to the stakeholder need. At the
completion of development, a system validation is necessary to ensure that the final system actually per-
forms as the stakeholders desire. And during the development, mission validation is also necessary to
encompass any changes that occur in the stakeholders perceptions.
These methods work reasonably well in normal system development. The characteristics of an SoS,
however, create issues that act to the detriment of these methods.
3 Systems of Systems Verification
The verification approach to system proof presupposes a known standard against which to verify. That
standard must be precise enough to act as a verifiable standard. For normal systems it is usually in the
form of requirements that are agreed or mandated by an authority for the system. In traditional systems
engineering, requirements serve six major purposes:
• Agreement. Requirements define the technical agreements between an acquirer and a supplier,
between stakeholders and developers, and between developers and testers.
• Contract bounds. Requirements serve as the technical definition of a contract for system devel-
opment.
• Analysis. Requirements provide the tool for analysis of the coherence, completeness, and correct-
ness of the technical definition. By analyzing the requirements against each other and against the
stakeholder needs, the technical definition can be made as assured as possible.
• In-process verification. Requirements provide the standard against which to verify the in-process
artifacts of design, as a way to check the design during the development process.
• Allocation. Requirements are allocated downward to lower levels of the system definition, with
bidirectional traceability to ensure that lower levels perform all the work and only the work neces-
sary for the system.
• System verification. Requirements provide the standard against which to verify the completed
system.
These are all useful purposes, which is why requirements have served well for many decades of
system development. However, in the case of the SoS, there are issues with every one of these purposes
that derive from the nature of the SoS itself, as shown in the table below. Even in the case of normal
systems, recent advances in Agile development have been questioning the utility of requirements for
evolutionary progress.
Dr. Eric Honour 5
Task System SoS
Define agreement
- Acquirer/supplier
- Stakeholders/
- developers/testers
All apply; roles are known;
agreement can happen
Conflicting goals; evolution-
ary growth; agreement is very
difficult
Define the technical bounds
on a contract
Used for contracting Typically NO SoS contract
Analysis for coherence,
complete, correct
Analysis as part of contract
work
Conflicting ideas of
“complete,” “correct”
Checking the design during
development
Reqs used at all reviews Development happens at CS
level
Allocation, trace into lower
levels
Part of system design work Only possible if SoS level has
been agreed
Checking each item at
completion
System verification;
component verification
Only possible if req’s have
been agreed
One solution for SoS verification is to use the constituent system validation events, commonly called
“operational test & evaluation (OT&E)” to verify the SoS functionality against the perceived SoS re-
quirements. This provides the advantage of exercising the SoS in a “real world” setting using experi-
enced human operators, but suffers the disadvantages of lack of firm control of the environment, lack of
repeatability, and lack of “ground truth” for the proof. The concept of verification is exceedingly difficult
for the SoS, primarily because of the need for firm requirements against which to verify. This need is
counter-indicated by the conflicting, evolutionary goals of the normal SoS. In one example of this diffi-
culty, the US Armys Future Combat Systems attempted to apply firm flow-down of requirements into the
largest procurement the US Department of Defense has run. The environment and needs evolved more
rapidly than the development team could manage. As a result, in six years of work the projected initial
deployment date moved seven years outward. The DoD cancelled the effort.
4 Systems of Systems Validation
Validation in the SoS presents its own set of difficulties, but is largely more tractable than verification.
There are multiple levels of test and evaluation in any SoS, that happen at asynchronous times:
• Interface certification testing frequently provides a means to qualify the constituent systems for
operation within the SoS.
• Constituent system developmental testing performs verification events on the constituent sys-
tems, controlled by the individual system owners and developers.
• Constituent system operational testing performs validation on the constituent systems, often
within the actual SoS environment.
• SoS simulations provide a method to execute some of the SoS operations in a controlled environ-
ment, although the accuracy of the simulations is always suspect.
• SoS testing typically occurs in situ during operation of the SoS in its real environment. In some
cases, it may be possible to perform testing during training events or preliminary operations. This
is often the only method to test and/or discover SoS emergent behaviors.
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The test responsibilities for these various events resides with different organizations, carrying through
the same SoS issues with managerial independence that create conflicting goals and conflicting desires.
Each constituent system has its own test responsibilities, with the test focus on the functions and perfor-
mance of that system. They may be motivated to be part of the SoS, but proof of the SoS is beyond the
scope of the constituent system test owners. There may or may not be a test owner at the SoS level who
has focus on the SoS testing.
Test and evaluation support to the SoS, however, is ongoing and nearly continuous. Each change to a
constituent system results in test events that affect the SoS. Each test event can provide key information
to guide the SoS engineering.
Because of the dynamic, evolutionary nature of the SoS, continuous validation of the SoS functional-
ity and performance is a viable approach to proof. As real-life events occur in operation, instrumentation
of the SoS response provides operating testing results that can feed back into the SoS engineering cycle.
In some cases, events may even be created in a controlled way to test specific functionality.
However, many SoS scenarios cannot be executed in real life due to various dangers to humans or
systems. In other cases, test scenarios may prevent the SoS from operating in essential ways. In such
cases, the best approach seems to be the use of SoS simulations. Such simulations require care. In many
cases, creating the simulations may be an extensive engineering effort. For any type of accuracy, the
simulations must reflect the stakeholder performance issues, conflicting goals, patterns, and emergent
behavior (both designed and unknown).
The validation approach to SoS proof recognizes the essentially subjective nature of the conflicting
stakeholder goals. An evolutionary development approach that embraces this nature can work well.
An example is the Global Earth Observation SoS (GEOSS). Envisioned in 2002 as a multi-national
effort, GEOSS has been working to connect and pool information from many disparate Earth observation
systems. Guided by an executive consortium of 12 members, the technical approach has been to create
interoperability while recognizing the charters of the individual systems. Work continues over a decade
later, with significant progress.
5 Conclusions
The nature of the SoS creates significant difficulties for system-level proof. In traditional systems engi-
neering, proof is created through verification and validation approaches.
Verification approaches, when applied to the SoS, have problems creating agreement on the standard
against which to verify. Conflicting goals, lack of an SoS authority, and evolutionary growth all con-
tribute to an inability to use requirements in the same way as in normal systems. There are also problems
with formal verification methods due to the informal nature of the SoS requirements, the lack of ability
to control SoS events, and the evolutionary growth that makes test planning difficult. System validation
events (operational test & evaluation) provide some ability to approach a form of SoS verification.
Validation approaches applied to the SoS appear to have better viability than verification approaches.
Validation recognizes the essentially subjective nature of the conflicting, evolutionary goals, allowing the
SoS configuration and proof to adapt over time as needed. Within the context of the ongoing SoS, in situ
evaluation offers the ability to use actual events, manufactured events, and simulations to provide a level
of proof that is commensurate with the level of definition.
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